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Abstract: Archimedes’ statics is considered as an example of ancient Greek applied mathematics; it 
is even seen as the beginning of mechanics. Wilbur Knorr made the case regarding this work, as 
other works by him or other mathematicians from ancient Greece, that it lacks references to the 
physical phenomena it is supposed to address. According to Knorr, this is understandable if we 
consider the propositions of the treatise in terms of purely mathematical elaborations suggested by 
quantitative aspects of the phenomena. In this paper, we challenge Knorr’s view, and address 
propositions of Archimedes’ statics in their relation to physical phenomena. 
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Resumen: La estática de Arquímedes se considera como un ejemplo de las matemáticas aplicadas de 
la antigua Grecia; incluso es vista como el inicio de la mecánica. Wilbur Knorr defendió con 
respecto a este trabajo, como otros trabajos de él u otros matemáticos de la antigua Grecia, que 
carece de referencias a los fenómenos físicos que se supone que debe abordar. Según Knorr, esto es 
comprensible si consideramos las proposiciones del tratado en términos de elaboraciones 
puramente matemáticas sugeridas por los aspectos cuantitativos de los fenómenos. En este trabajo, 
desafiamos la idea de Knorr y abordamos las proposiciones de la estática de Arquímedes en su 
relación con los fenómenos físicos. 
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Short summary: Archimedes’ statics is an example of ancient Greek applied mathematics. Knorr 
made the case, regarding this and other works, that it lacks references to the physical phenomena it 
supposedly addresses. To Knorr, this is understandable if we consider the propositions of the treatise 
as purely mathematical elaborations suggested by quantitative aspects of the phenomena. Here, we 
challenge Knorr’s view. 
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1. Elements of Archimedes’ statics 
The only extant mathematical treatment of the lever by Archimedes is the treatise Planes in 
Equilibrium.1 This work has a twofold purpose. On one side we have a mathematical approach to the 
statics of the lever; and on the other side we find the mathematical determination of centres of 
gravity. The term “planes” in the title is to be understood as making reference to plane figures; i.e., 
to geometrical figures, as described, e.g., in the part of Euclid’s Elements addressing planar geometry 
(Euclid, 1908). The two issues addressed in the treatise are not however independent themes; simply, 
Archimedes devotes part of the work to the determination of the centres of gravity of different 
geometrical figures, which is not strictly necessary to his treatment of the statics of the lever. Thus, it 
is clear that the work also aims to address the determination of centres of gravity and goes beyond 
the consideration of the statics of the lever.2 
     Archimedes’ treatise begins with seven postulates or principles. From these, and mathematical 
results demonstrated in other works, a series of propositions are demonstrated. Some of the 
principles are as follows: 
 
1. Equal weights at equal distances are in equilibrium, and equal weights at unequal distances are not 
in equilibrium but incline towards the weight which is at the greater distance. 
4. When equal and similar plane figures coincide if applied to one another, their centres of gravity 
similarly coincide. 
6. If magnitudes at certain distances be in equilibrium, (other) magnitudes equal to them will also be 
in equilibrium at the same distance. (Heath, 1897, pp. 189-190; see also Mugler, 1971, p. 80)  
 
We can notice that while there are references to geometrical terms, and implicitly to mathematical 
magnitudes (as we will see), there are terms which clearly are not mathematical.3 The terms 
“equilibrium” and “incline” make reference to physical phenomena related to levers. As stated in 
principle 1, interpreted as an experimental principle, if we suspend equal weights from the arms of a 
lever at an equal distance from the fulcrum of the lever, it will not move—it will be in equilibrium. If 
the weights are suspended at unequal distances, we observe that the arms of the lever move from the 
horizontal position towards the weight at a greater distance from the fulcrum. Principle 1, like the 
others, can be seen as general principles, gathered and corroborated by experience, the majority of 
which relate to a simple machine—the lever. Regarding “weight” and “distance”, these are addressed 
in the treatise in two related ways. As expressing physical phenomena, principle 1 relates to weight 
and distance as measurable quantities; however, as a principle of applied mathematics, it takes them 
as mathematical magnitudes. When observing the particular phenomena related to the lever leading 
to principle 1, its expression in terms of this principle only makes sense if we start from a practical 
notion of distance and weight. That is, we need to measure the weights and conclude that they are, in 
practical terms, equal, and the same for the distances. There is no difficulty with this. Both weight 
and distance (length) were determinable in ancient Greece in terms of metrological systems. We 
have units of weight in relation to which we determine the weight of a body. Equivalently, we have 
units of length in relation to which we can determine distances.4 Having measured two bodies as 
being, in practical terms, of the same weight, and suspending them from each arm of a lever at 
distances measured as the same, we observe that the lever maintains its equilibrium—the arms do not 
																																								 																				
1 According to Heath, several treatises by Archimedes on mechanics might have been lost (Heath, 1921, pp. 28-9). 
2 The rationale for this might well be the intention to supersede a previous erroneous method for the determination of a 
centre of gravity (see Dijksterhuis, 1956, pp. 303-4). 
3 In this work, we adopt the term mathematical magnitude when referring to magnitudes as developed in the book 5 of 
Euclid’s Elements, in relation to which one has the notions of ratio and proportional magnitudes. We can notice in 
principle 6 the term “magnitude”. Here, it has a completely different meaning from “magnitude” in the Elements; it is 
used to denote a material body whose shape is not relevant, only its weight and centre of gravity. 
4 On ancient Greek metrology see, e.g., Gyllenbok (2018). 
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move and are still on the horizontal. This is the phenomenon that is expressed in the first part of 
principle 1.5 
     However, in relation to the role of principle 1, or others, in the demonstrations of the various 
propositions, the reference to weight and distance cannot be read as referring to metrological 
notions—weight and distance as measured in relation to some adopted units. Weight and distance are 
treated (represented) as mathematical magnitudes. This will become clear when addressing the 
propositions. In this way, while we might consider at first principle 1, like the others, in relation to 
the phenomena it describes, as an experimental principle, as applied in the treatise it must be 
understood as a principle of applied mathematics. A principle that while retaining references to the 
description of physical phenomena related to levers—and terms like “equilibrium” and “incline” are 
only meaningful in this context—, treats “metrological” concepts like “weight” and “distance” using 
notions from pure mathematics—weight as a mathematical magnitude and distance as the 
mathematical magnitude of a straight line. 
      Another crucial notion for Archimedes’ statics is that of centre of gravity. It is referred to in a 
few of the principles but, like with other terms, there is no explicit definition of it. However, 
important aspects of the notion of centre of gravity are implicit in the treatise. As Eduard 
Dijksterhuis mentioned, principle 6 can be understood as stating that the equilibrium of a lever is not 
affected if the bodies that are suspended from their centre of gravity are substituted by other bodies 
with different shapes but with the same weight as that of each of the original bodies and suspended 
also from their centres of gravity (Dijksterhuis, 1956, p. 293). It is as if in what regards the effect of 
the weight of bodies on the equilibrium of the lever, all of a body’s weight is “concentrated” at the 
centre of gravity. In Archimedes’ statics, the centre of gravity is given a mathematical description. 
More exactly, it is represented as a geometrical point. For example, proposition 4 states the 
following: 
 
If two equal magnitudes have not the same centre of gravity, the centre of gravity of the magnitude 
composed of the two magnitudes will be the middle point of the straight line joining the centres of 
gravity of the magnitudes. (Dijksterhuis, 1956, p. 288)  
 
Regarding the bodies suspended from a lever, these are represented as planar geometrical figures. 
For example, principle 4 explicitly refers to planar figures (as does the title of the treatise). Principles 
1, 2, 3, and 6 are general in the sense of making a mathematical rendering of the description of 
physical phenomena related to a lever with bodies of different shapes suspended from it. Principles 
4, 5, and 7 do not have that generality. We can see them as stating results related to thin bodies 
(Heath, 1897, pp. 189-190; Mugler, 1971, pp. 77 & 80-1). 
     Another geometrical representation at play is that of the lever itself. The lever is represented as a 
straight line (and its fulcrum as a point). This can be seen, e.g., in proposition 3, in which the straight 
line, joining two unequal weights A and B, represents a lever, and a point C of this straight line 
represents its fulcrum. The lever is in equilibrium for some distances AC and BC of the centres of 
gravity of the weights (points A and B) from the point C. Proposition 3 states that unequal weights 
can only be in equilibrium when the greater weight is at a lesser distance from the fulcrum than the 
other weight. That is, AC must be less than BC (Heath, 1897, pp. 190-1). 
     The early propositions of the treatise (one to five) can be seen as preparatory or even necessary to 
the demonstrations of propositions 6 and 7, which state that two magnitudes (bodies) are in 
equilibrium at distances reciprocally proportional to their weights. This result is known as the law or 
principle of the lever (see, e.g., Renn et al., 2003, p. 48; Dugas, 1957, p. 24). Take A to be the weight 
of the first body described as a mathematical magnitude. Likewise, B is the weight, as a 
																																								 																				
5 As mentioned by a reviewer: “the principle implicitly assumes indifference to other differences—not merely to 
differences of color and material, but to position right and left of the fulcrum”. 
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mathematical magnitude, of the second body. E and D are the centres of gravity of the first and 
second body respectively. They are points on a straight line representing a lever. Finally, let C be the 
point on the straight line representing the fulcrum of the lever. EC is the distance (as a mathematical 
magnitude) of the centre of gravity of body A from the point C, and DC is the distance of the centre 
of gravity of body B from point C. The demonstrations of the propositions show that the ratio of the 
mathematical magnitudes A and B is the same as the ratio of the mathematical magnitudes DC and 
EC (Heath, 1897, pp. 192-4; see also Mugler, 1971, pp. 85-8). That is, the magnitudes are in the 
same ratio, in the mathematical sense of book 5 of Euclid’s Elements.6 
     While we are considering propositions of applied mathematics, we can note, as was the case with 
other propositions, that the main statement of the propositions is made in mathematical terms. That 
is, the phrase “two magnitudes are in equilibrium at distances reciprocally proportional to their 
weights” must be interpreted as meaning, using a modern standard notation, A:B::DC:EC (see, e.g., 
Netz, 2004, p. 5). As previously mentioned, the principles are already couched in mathematical 
terms, as can be seen when taking them into account in the demonstration of the propositions. For 
example, in proposition 3 we consider principle 1 in relation to two possibilities, that of the 
mathematical magnitudes AC and BC being equal or AC being greater than BC (Heath, 1897, pp. 
190-1). Principle 1 can only be meaningfully applied in the demonstrations of propositions if the 
reference to distances in it is to distances as mathematically described, and not as measured 
distances. However, being the principles a mathematical rendering of the description of physical 
phenomena related to levers or centres of gravity, and relying on terms like “equilibrium”, “incline”, 
or “centre of gravity”, they are not principles of pure mathematics. Should we expect a deduction 
from these principles—a proposition—to be also about the phenomena taken into account in these 
principles? But how to address, in these propositions (or in their demonstrations), the simultaneous 
reference to terms related to the description of the phenomena and to mathematical terms? 
     What is at issue is the status of Archimedes’ propositions in relation to pure mathematics and to 
physical phenomena. Clarifying this might help to better understand Archimedes’ applied 
mathematics in the case of statics—to understand his propositions about statics and the interplay of 
the references to physical phenomena and to pure mathematics. 
 
 
2. Knorr’s thesis and our challenge to it with respect to Archimedes’ statics 
 
That Archimedes’ treatise is one of applied mathematics seems quite uncontroversial. In fact, 
Archimedes’ statics is seen as establishing the foundations of a new exact science—the science of 
mechanics, which, nowadays, is one of the branches of physics (Dugas, 1957, p. 24; Mugler, 1971, p. 
77). However, when considering a view proposed by Knorr, we might question what being applied 
mathematics in the case of Archimedes’ statics might mean and imply.  Regarding Archimedes’ 
treatise, and other works by him and other authors, Knorr asks the following: “If they indeed sought 
knowledge of the physical phenomena, why should they conceal the links between their theorems 
and the phenomena?” (Knorr, 1989, p. 323). Knorr answer his question with the following thesis: 
 
If we view the present set of treatises not as efforts toward the mathematical analysis of certain 
classes of physical phenomena, but instead as the elaboration of fields in pure geometry suggested by 
the quantitative relations applying to these phenomena, then we obtain a different perspective. The 
suppression of phenomenal references would be bizarre in a theory devoted to the explanation of 
those phenomena; but it is entirely appropriate in a purely mathematical inquiry into the geometric 
relations they satisfy. (Knorr, 1989, pp. 324-5) 
																																								 																				
6 In Euclid’s Elements, the ratios are always of magnitudes of the same type. The adoption of ratios between different 
types of magnitudes is a much later development. Possibly, its earliest relevant application was made by Galileo (see, 
e.g., Valente, 2019). 
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That the principles are principles of applied mathematics should not be controversial. They are based 
on physical phenomena related to the lever, but they include the mathematical rendering of parts of 
the description of the phenomena. For example, as mentioned, principle 1 treats “weight” and 
“distance”—that in the practice related to the phenomena under consideration are metrologically 
defined—as mathematical magnitudes. However, we do not agree with Knorr when he writes that in 
his treatise Archimedes “suppresses overt mechanical references, as to weights or balances, and 
speaks instead in terms of magnitudes and equilibrium” (Knorr, 1989, p. 323): Weights are 
mentioned throughout the work when needed (but treated as mathematical magnitudes); magnitudes 
(in the principles and propositions) refer to material bodies considered only with respect to their 
weights and centres of gravity, not to the mathematical magnitude; balances or levers are represented 
by straight lines; “equilibrium” is not a mathematical term (using Knorr’s phrasing, it is a 
mechanical term).  
     While in this work Archimedes does not give a definition of centre of gravity, as mentioned, 
principle 6 refers to an important feature of the centre of gravity: when a body is suspended from its 
centre of gravity it is as if all its weight is located there.  As Knorr acknowledges, Archimedes had a 
“physical conception” of centre of gravity which he mentioned in his treatise Quadrature of the 
parabola (Knorr, 1989, p. 318). What the phrasing “physical conception” means is that Archimedes 
had what we might call an experimental knowledge of how to determine the centre of gravity of a 
material body. According to Archimedes: “Every suspended body, no matter what its point of 
suspension, assumes an equilibrium state when the point of suspension and the centre of gravity are 
on the same vertical line” (cited in Assis, 2010, p. 124; see also Mugler, 1971, p. 171). As Andre 
Assis mentions, this statement regarding the centre of gravity shows that Archimedes knew a 
practical procedure to determine the centre of gravity (Assis, 2010, p. 124).  
     That Archimedes’ physical conceptions on statics go beyond what we might consider being 
present in the treatise’s principles (or left implicit), does not have to bear on Knorr’s views. As Knorr 
mentioned, Archimedes’ treatise “does not necessarily represent the complete range of [his] views on 
the nature of mechanics” (Knorr, 1989, p. 318). However, the principle of the lever demonstrated in 
his work, in our view, shows that Archimedes had a previous knowledge of this principle as what we 
have called an experimental principle—i.e. a principle describing physical phenomena. As 
mentioned, the first part of the treatise is a sequence of demonstrations of propositions leading to the 
demonstration of the principle of the lever. Should we suppose that Archimedes chose his principles 
in some ad hoc way and then by mere luck found that proposition 6 and 7 could be deduced from 
part of them?  We think this simply cannot be the case. The principle of the lever was already known 
previous to Archimedes. In the treatise called Mechanical problems, the law or principle of the lever 
had already been formulated and addressed, even if in terms different from those of Archimedes 
(Renn et al., 2003, pp. 46-7). Accordingly, “the law must have been well known when it was given a 
proof a generation or two later by Euclid and Archimedes” (Renn et al., 2003, p. 47). Importantly, 
the formulation of the principle of the lever did not happen ex nihilo, it arose in the context of “the 
practical knowledge related to the balance with unequal arms” (Renn et al., 2003, p. 47).  
     We could imagine a treatise alternative to that of Archimedes in which the principle of the lever is 
taken as one of the principles, and from it and other principles some propositions are derived. As 
such its status must be the same as that of the principles of the treatise of Archimedes. Simply, 
Archimedes organized his work in such a way that this principle was derived—as a proposition—
from other “simpler” principles. Being possibly a very well-known description of a physical 
phenomenon related to the lever (as its presence in the earlier Mechanical problems leads us to 
think), it would not make sense to Archimedes to press the point that it refers to physical phenomena. 
This would be self-evident. Contrary to Knorr’s view, there is no suppression of phenomenal 
references. Also, in relation to the sequence of demonstrations ending with propositions 6 and 7, we 
do not assist to the elaboration of statics in terms of pure geometry, what we have is the deduction of 
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an experimental principle—rendered as an applied mathematics proposition—from other 
experimental principles that are rendered as applied mathematics principles.7  
     Propositions 6 and 7, like, e.g., principle 1, must be understood in the context of a previous 
understanding of phenomena associated to levers. In particular, “weight” and “distance” are, first of 
all, to be considered in terms of metrological systems. We can consider the description of physical 
phenomena, which are rendered in part mathematically in principle 1 and propositions 6 and 7, 
without reference to pure mathematics. As it is the statement of these experimental principles can be 
the same as that in applied mathematics:  
 
Experimental principle 1: Equal weights at equal distances are in equilibrium, and equal weights at 
unequal distances are not in equilibrium but incline towards the weight which is at the greater 
distance. 
 
Experimental principle of the lever: Two magnitudes (bodies) are in equilibrium at distances 
reciprocally proportional to their weights. 
 
Here, we simply consider “weight” and “distance” in terms of measures made adopting the 
corresponding metrological systems. In this context, of measurements, the terms “equal”, “unequal”, 
or “proportional” must not be understood as terms of pure mathematics, but, e.g., in terms of 
practical measurements and the practical equality or inequality of measured weights and distances 
(or the practical reciprocal proportionality of the division of the weights to the division of the 
distances).   
    In Archimedes’ applied mathematics these experimental principles are in part rendered 
mathematically. For example, weights are described as mathematical magnitudes; the same happens 
with distances between two points on a straight line. This will enable, in propositions 6 and 7, to 
relate the ratio of two weights (which is meaningful because weights are treated as mathematical 
magnitudes) to the rate of two distances (also treated as mathematical magnitudes). We obtain a pure 
mathematics result: one ratio is proportional to the other. However, we still make reference, e.g., to 
terms like “equilibrium” and “incline” in the demonstrations. In this way, while, e.g., the final result 
of the demonstration of propositions 6 and 7, corresponds to what we now might call a mathematical 
expression (A:B::DC:EC), the mathematical terms are a representation of terms adopted in the 
description of physical phenomena related to levers. In particular, “weight” as a mathematical 
magnitude is a representation of “weight” as determined in terms of a metrological system of units 
(to simplify, a weight as measured in practice). The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to distances. To 
further extract the practical meaning of the applied mathematics proposition, one only needs to take 
into account that the straight line going from D to E represents the lever, and C its fulcrum. The 
mathematical result translated into an experimental principle means that when two unequal weight 
(as measured) are suspended from the arms of a lever, the ratio (the division) of the practically 
measured distances (as numbers) must be reciprocally proportional to the ratio (the division) of the 
practically measured weights (as numbers). Contrary to Knorr’s view, we do not have a development 
of statics in pure geometry. 
																																								 																				
7	It is a fact that in his treatise Archimedes also demonstrates a series of propositions related to the centre of gravity. The 
motivation for this might be, as mentioned, the intention to supersede a previous erroneous method for the determination 
of a centre of gravity. But even if this is so, the sequence of demonstrations in book 2 leading to proposition 8 where 
Archimedes determines the centre of gravity of a segment of a parabola, relies on a highly sophisticated mathematical 
approach. Here, we might seem to have a vindication of Knorr’s position—an elaboration of statics in terms of pure 
geometry. But there is an important difference. Even in the case of the centre of gravity of a segment of a parabola, 
Archimedes is not actually making an elaboration of the field in pure geometry. Archimedes is working in applied 
mathematics, not pure mathematics. 
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    Ultimately what Archimedes achieves in this part of his statics is to show that the experimental 
principle of the lever can be deduced from other experimental principles. In the process he makes 
explicit that pure mathematics can be used to represent part of the physical phenomena in a way that 
is integrated with the non-mathematical description of other aspects of the physical phenomena (e.g. 
when using the notions of equilibrium and inclination), such that from experimental principles 
(rendered as applied mathematical ones) one can deduce applied mathematics propositions that are 
the rendering of other experimental principles. 
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